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Abstract This article highlights the contribution of ethnography and qualitative
sociology to the ethical challenges that frame the diagnosis of dementia. To illustrate
this contribution, the paper draws on an ethnographic study of UK memory clinics
carried out between 2012 and 2014. The ethnographic data, set alongside other studies
and sociological theory, contest the promotion of a traditional view of autonomy; the
limiting of the point of ethical interest to a distinct moment of diagnosis disclosure;
and the failure to recognise risk and uncertainty in the building of clinical ‘facts’ and
their communication. In addressing these specific concerns, this article contributes to
the wider debate over the relationship between sociology and bioethics (medical eth-
ics). At the heart of these debates lies more fundamental questions: how can we best
understand and shape moral decision-making and ethics that guide behaviour in me-
dical practice, and what should be the guiding ideas, concepts and methods to inform
ethics in the clinic? Using the case of dementia diagnosis, this article illustrates the
benefits of an ethnographic approach, not just for understanding this ethical problem
but also for exploring if and how a more empirically informed ethics can help shape
healthcare practices for the better.
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Introduction
Given the centrality of autonomy, beneficence and informed consent with regard
to issues of diagnosis disclosure to modern bioethical thinking, it is unsurprising
that scholars in this area have found diagnosis disclosure in dementia particularly
challenging. For example, scholars have tended to focus on issues that are high
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on the public agenda or are particularly extreme (Musschenga, 2005), with much
of the ethical debate centred on advanced directives or debates over the right to
die (DeGrazia, 1999). In a similar vein, issues relating to dementia diagnosis have
tended to focus, not on current practice, but on a potential future in which
neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease, can be diagnosed with
a high degree of accuracy, pre-symptomatically, allowing for the extremes of the
debate to come to the fore (see, for example, Powell, 2014). Focussing on the
extremes of the argument is symptomatic of the epistemological grounding of
ethics in moral philosophy, which relies on systems of argumentation to develop
its theory. This is a practice better served using the tools of imagined or
hypothetical scenarios that can be driven by theory rather than the detail and
nuance of an actual clinical case. Principles, therefore, take priority in the sense
that they justify or criticise practice (Arras, 1991).
The relative lack of attention from ethicists to the issue of current diagnoses
disclosures in dementia is based on two key assumptions: firstly, that clinicians
have an ethical imperative to inform patients of their diagnosis, unless they
choose not to know (Marzanski, 2000) [at least this is the case in western
medical practice (Henrique, 2003)] and, secondly, that the evaluation of
practices of disclosure (that is the way in which a diagnosis is given) is the
subject of psychologists or other disciplines that focus on the analysis of
communication and its effects. Subsequently, the question of whether to tell
people their diagnosis is perceived to be a question of ethics but the question of
how such a diagnosis is shared is assumed to be a question for social science.
The power of concrete principles through which to develop guidelines for
medical research and practice has arguably intensified over the past thirty to
40 years in the UK, resulting in what Reubi (2013) has described as an
increasingly influential ‘bioethical thought collective’. This article illustrates
how ethnography can inform the framing of an ethical debate in relation to the
diagnosis of dementia, developed not through principles, but through the
study of practices. By doing this, the paper contributes to a wider body of
work that highlights the contribution of empirical social research and
sociological theory, to the understanding of moral and ethical practice in
medical work (Haimes, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2004). The view of the individual as
the truest measure of ethics that transcends culture has been historically
challenged by sociologists who recognise society, social structures and
cultures as both informing and, more significantly, producing moral norms.
As a consequence, sociologists have looked to social practices through which
moral norms are produced to challenge, shape and inform ethics. Such an
approach privileges practice and experience and challenges a bioethics that
seeks to develop moral codes based on the philosophy of individual thought
and action. Taking this as its starting point, this paper builds on the
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contributions of Cicourel (2006, 2011, 2013), Beard (2008), Beard and Neary
(2013), Beard and Fox (2008) and Moreira (2010) in particular, who have
undertaken ethnographic work in memory clinics, to better understand ethics
and moral understandings in the context of dementia diagnosis.
The Ethnography
This article draws on an ethnography undertaken in two memory clinics in the
UK, carried out between 2012 and 2014. Both clinics were based in large
university teaching hospitals, one in a city location, the other located in a rural
area. Both memory clinics functioned in very similar ways, assessing patients
experiencing problems with thinking and memory. The most common route
through which patients attended the memory clinic was through referral from
their general practitioner (GPs). Other routes included referral from another
community or primary care service such as day centres, or less commonly
from secondary services or by referral by patients themselves or by their
relative or carer. Following referral, patients have an initial assessment. This
assessment involves the following: cognitive tests (most commonly under-
taken in a separate adjoining room by a psychologist or nurse practitioner but
sometimes carried out by the doctor or psychiatrist as part of the consulta-
tion); the taking of a detailed patient history by asking questions of the patient
themselves and their relative/carer; and clinical tests – some done on site that
day, others arranged for a later date – including blood tests (mostly done to
exclude any other potential clinical cause of their memory problem), a trace of
the heart if it is a possibility that the patient may require medication for their
memory which carries contraindications for some heart arrhythmias and,
increasingly, a Computerised Tomography (CT) scan of the brain.
The fieldwork was made up of observations in the memory clinics. This
involved both the audio recording of clinical consultations, alongside
observations and the taking of fieldnotes of the encounters. This approach
captured talk and interactions involved in initial patient assessments, the
discussion of test results and processes of diagnoses as well as the broader
social, material and spatial contexts in which these encounters took place.
Over the periods of observation, 51 consultations were observed. As well as
the in-clinic observation, the researcher interviewed 13 memory clinic staff, 21
patients who had attended a memory clinic, 19 relatives/carers (10 of the
patients and relatives were interviewed twice and one couple were
interviewed three times) and 10 research experts working in the field of
dementia. Due to the focus of this article, the material presented focusses on
the in-clinic consultations and the accounts of memory clinic staff.
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Analysis, as with most ethnography, began in the field, interpreting the
social meaning of actions and interactions and situating them in their wider
contexts. The fieldwork process intended to make visible the practices of
valuing itself, to show the production of morals in the everyday actions and
interactions that occurred in the clinic. All ethnographic research, to some
extent, implicitly impinges on ethics, as its practice implies the evaluation of
persons, events, motives and consequences. The approach of this ethnogra-
phy was to reject the mystery of the moral order within (as Kant so famously
described it), and instead to focus attention on the ‘moral order without’
(Garfinkel, 1964), to pay attention to the collaborative production of moral
orders and to show how moral understandings shift together, in many daily
interactions of social life (Walker, 2010). Paying attention to the production of
morals in clinic interactions or in clinician’s accounts of their practice is
therefore essential to understand what specific kinds of ethics are produced in
memory clinics and in what circumstances.
Selected examples from the field and from interviews have been chosen on
the basis of their capacity to exemplify the concepts, justifications and
explanations of clinicians and/or patients and families, which enable them to
make sense of the social situation. They have also been chosen to help
illustrate how social practices and their material form help accomplish what is
ethical in the context of dementia diagnosis. In making these selections, the
researcher is of course engaged in a constant dialogue between the
interpretations of actor’s sense-making practices and their own interpretation
of social theory and other social studies of dementia or memory clinics. Such a
dialogue is further mediated by the researcher’s own participation in the same
conversations and encounters and bringing to them their own set of
experiences. In a sense, this is the very essence of ethnography, to utilise
the mundane practices of sense-making through which we, as social actors,
experience and participate in the world as a tool for interpretative analysis
(Ingold, 2014).
Dementia Diagnosis and Interactional Ethics
The shared contribution of previous ethnographic work in memory clinics
(Cicourel, 2006, 2011, 2013; Beard, 2008; Beard and Fox, 2008; Beard and
Neary, 2013; Moreira, 2010), which of course have differing concerns and
interests, is to show how there are tensions in memory clinics regarding the
location of memory, which can be condensed into an individual’s body – their
brain – while simultaneously distributing memory loss to the people and
communities surrounding the person (Moreira, 2010). Highlighting this
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tension is significant for understanding the moral and ethical framing of the
diagnostic process in the memory clinic, to show the multiple agendas being
enacted and the necessarily collaborative processes through which a decision
regarding the causes of memory loss are reached and communicated. Building
upon these previous contributions, this work challenges the restriction of
ethical interest to a single point of diagnosis disclosure, highlighting the social,
collaborative and processual nature with which a diagnosis is reached and the
production of ethics that emerge through the course of these social practices.
The signicance of the patient and relative’s story
A significant contribution of ethnographic insight into the practices of
dementia diagnosis is to highlight the experiences of those attending memory
clinics and to forefront patients’ stories of memory loss or cognitive decline. As
Beard and Fox’s work (2008) shows, processes of diagnosis require a transition
to occur from everyday forgetfulness – the patient’s experience – to a medical
problem – a symptom. Attending to this process is important in ascertaining
the meanings attached to memory by patients themselves but also in
recognising the ethics that are imbued in the transformation that occurs from
the patient’s story, to clinical symptoms and finally to a medical explanation. In
this study, patients’ perceptions regarding their capacities to think and
remember are shown to be shaped by their being in the world: their physical,
social and cultural environment, as the following extract exemplifies:
The doctor tells me that the next appointment is with a man in his
seventies who has a history of depression but has been referred to the
clinic by his GP due to experiencing difficulties with concentration and
memory. The man knocks on the door of the assessment room, enters
slowly and sits on the chair opposite the doctor. Following brief
introductions, the doctor asks for his perspective of why he’s there,
Doctor: Talk me through it from your point of view.
Patient: Well, I was – I retired early.
Doctor: Yeah, when was that?.
Patient: Oh, when I was 60. I’ve been travelling round the world ever since,
in a motor home.
Doctor: Fine, sounds good to me.
Patient: The last couple of years, because I lost confidence in myself and I
have a wife, and I didn’t want to cause any problems ‘cause the
roads get faster, everything gets faster and I was slowing down. So I
decided it was time to knock it on the head and – so we live in a
caravan now.
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The conversation continues with little in the way of direct explanations
offered by the doctor and ends with a plan of further tests and the
suggestion of a change of medication for his mood.
In this extract, the patient’s description of his problem is framed by the social
and temporal characteristics of his environment – ‘everything gets faster’
while he was slowing down. His description of experiencing difficulties with
his thinking is manifest in his interactions with the social world in which he is
embedded. The account of this man is indicative of the distinction made by
Beard and Fox (2008) between the patients’ experience, that is likely to be
socially shaped, and the transformation that is required for this to become
symptomatic of a medical problem. Similarly, memory – or lapses in memory –
often require social interaction with others to identify them as something out of
the ordinary, as a problem to be addressed:
Later that afternoon we see a lady in her early 80s. Although she is quiet
and pleasant, she makes it quite clear that she sees little value in being at
the clinic or in the assessment process. She sits with her arms crossed,
opposite the doctor, with her husband sat on a chair next to her. The
doctor begins by asking about what brought them to the clinic,
Doctor: Perhaps what instigated you to go to the memory team and what the
concerns were?
Patient: Right. Well all I can say is my husband advised it and I was a bit
surprised because I always thought I had a pretty good memory, but
when two or three times it happened that he said, ‘‘Oh remember so
and so?’’ and I said, ‘‘I can’t remember.’’ You know, that’s the only
reason actually my husband was interested to find out why, why it
was like it.
Doctor: So did you go to the GP initially?
Patient: No, I hadn’t done. It’s just my husband just decided it.
Doctor: So you contacted the memory team directly?
Patient: Right. I presume my husband did [laughs].
Doctor: So it’s been more would you say other people perhaps that have –
Patient: I think so.
As the consultation progresses, the doctor hints at possible explanations,
suggesting that this might be more than the consequence of getting older
and that they have to consider whether this might be a form of dementia.
They agree, although the patient herself is somewhat reluctant, that she
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will have a CT scan and return to the clinic following the scan when they
will discuss the issue further.
This extract reflects the social nature of the dementia experience, highlighting
the breaking of social norms and expectations that are often only recognised
by the patient themselves through their interactions with the people around
them. Similarly the extract below is a reflection of many examples of
interactions in the memory clinic in which the patient’s account of their
‘problem’ is inextricably bound up in their relationship with important people
in their lives:
An elderly couple have come to the memory clinic for a second time for
the purposes of checking whether the problems they have been
experiencing have deteriorated. The husband, who has memory prob-
lems, is smiley and reflects positively about his life and situation. His
wife sits and listens to his account but shows more signs of concern,
wringing her hands together while her husband speaks.
Doctor: How have things been since you last came up in May?
Patient: No problems as far as I’m concerned.
Doctor: No, okay. Are you noticing any problems with the memory at all?
Patient: I do forget things. My wife, she remembers everything.
The patient looks over to his wife who is sat next to him and offers a
smile, she smiles back although doesn’t manage to erase the worried
expression that had preceded it. The consultation ends with the couple
being told that it could now be confident that this is probably
Alzheimer’s disease, given the progressive nature of the problems the
patient is experiencing.
Close family relationships, and marital relationships in particular, shape the
content of patient stories in the clinic so that a memory ‘problem’ is determined
to a large extent by the nature of these relationships and their everyday
functioning. This patient’s wife remembers for them both so that his forgetting
ceases to be a concern for the patient himself. This also has ramifications for a
person’s experience of the condition as the effects of dementia’s symptoms on
the person with the disease have been shown to be influenced by the
perceptions and responses of people around them (Langdon et al, 2007).
Constituting personhood and relational autonomy
Recognising that patients’ experiences of memory are situated, embodied and
shaped by their interdependent relationships with others is significant because
Hillman
50  2016 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 1, 44–65
it challenges some assumptions bound up in the traditional meaning of
autonomy, which remains a dominant ethical discourse within bioethics,
medical practice and within media representations of medical ethics (Hedge-
coe, 2004). Furthermore, respect for autonomy, as a principle of bioethics (see
Beauchamp and Childress, 2013), is central to the ethical framing of diagnostic
disclosure in dementia (Pinner, 2000). There is however widespread criticism
of mainstream bioethics, from within its own discipline and from those
observing it, for overemphasising the significance of autonomy, for its asocial
framing of individual agency and for being increasingly aligned to an Anglo-
American cultural preoccupation with individualism (Dekkers, 2001; Holm,
1995; Fox and Swazey, 2008; Zussman, 1997; Christman, 2004; Code, 1991).
Observational engagement, of the kind utilised by ethnographers, can help to
re-examine representations of personal autonomy by recognising its capacity,
in its universalist form, to (re)produce ideas of personhood that shape
everyday practices both within and beyond the clinic. The dominance of this
specific conceptualisation of autonomy can get reproduced in the accounts
and practices of those working in the clinical domain, as this extract from an
interview with one of the doctors in the memory clinic team illustrates:
Ethically this is his information he is the one with the disease. I say that
said, you know if it becomes apparent that it’s very distressing to him
them I’m not going to persist and go on about it but equally he has a
right to know.
Here, the staff member describes the rights of the individual – as an
autonomous agent – who should be fully informed of their diagnosis. Of
course, this is muddied by the possibility that this knowledge could cause
distress, as well as the difficulty of knowing what a diagnosis actually means
for the patient and their future, thus calling into question the very possibility
of being ‘fully informed’ (Corrigan, 2003). Nevertheless, the staff’s account of
their practice remains framed by the view of personhood constituted through
this particular conception of autonomy.
Dementia itself is a condition that challenges a view of the person as being
defined by particular sorts of mental activity (Hughes, 2001). Agency (the
capacity to determine and act upon one’s wishes) is claimed as an essential
component of individual autonomy in its traditionalist form (Beauchamp and
Childress, 2013), reflecting the philosophical traditions of Kant, Locke and
Hume in which the person is constituted as an intelligent being that has
reason and reflection. Personhood in this regard is made up of particular
psychological states and their continuity and connection. For those with
dementia, whose illness can disrupt psychological continuity and connection,
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between past memories and present events for example, this meaning can
result in a loss of personhood (Hughes, 2001).
This meaning of autonomy – that constitutes personhood in this way – is
particularly problematic for valuing the lived experience of those with
dementia and subsequently for shaping an ethical practice for dementia
diagnosis that ensures the personhood and worth of those with dementia is
maintained. Jenkins (2014), for example, argues that the conceptualisation of
personhood as a bounded, distinct and unique entity is so entrenched in
western contemporary culture that the preoccupation with an individualised
self has been replicated in the development of ‘person-centred’ dementia care,
which aims to ensure the person with dementia is treated as an individual:
I suppose the thing is that there is no text book rule, you just manage
every person as an individual really.
Although that person isn’t me, that person isn’t my Mum or Dad, they’re
different people, and they’re individuals.
In these two extracts, taken from interviews with memory clinic staff,
recognition of the individual is highlighted as being central to the ways in
which staff account for the ethics of their clinical practice. However, it is less
clear what ‘the individual’ in these reflections consists of. What makes up an
individual person in the context of ethical practice in communicating a
dementia diagnosis? Person-centred care has been an important keystone in
the improvement of treatment and care for those with dementia, developed to
a large extent in response to Kitwood’s (1997) promotion of personhood.
Although recognising these improvements, Jenkins problematises the partic-
ular conception of the individual (as fixed and stable) that is often bound up
in the discourses and practices of person-centred care, that fail to recognise
personhood as a state of becoming, one that is produced through interactional
encounters. Interestingly, this concept of the individual was also challenged
by Kitwood himself, who recognised personhood as essentially relational, so
that social interaction is constitutive of personhood.
In the case of memory clinic staff, there is a continual tension expressed in
their accounts of ethical practice. On the one hand, clinicians reflect
philosophies of the person that are bound up in the codes of ethics they are
most familiar with, which construct patients as asocial individuals, with the
capacities to make free and reasoned choices based on full information. On
the other hand, clinicians also construct personhood in a way that reflects
their cumulative experience of engaging with patients and families experi-
encing dementia, witnessing first-hand the difficulty of disentangling the
patient – and their diagnosis – from the perceptions, needs and concerns of
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their loved ones. This tension is reflected in the extract below taken from an
interview with one of the geriatricians working in the memory clinic:
I mean I haven’t got much problems of discussing thing with the
relatives as well. Because the relatives are obviously, they’re directly
involved. They need information about the illness and I think they need
to be told the diagnosis sort of clearly. And sometimes they are the only
ones that understand what you are talking about. So really yes, it has to
be patient’s confidentiality and all respect for the patient but in some, I
think in some cases you have to be sensible. And I don’t think you act for
the best interest of the patient sort of explaining to carers or giving a
diagnosis to carers. At the same time sometimes or even on the same sort
of clinic sometimes you’re putting the picture, the carers even a bit
before the patients. And you know as far as you’re sort of honest with
the patient, as much as the patient wants to know.
Responding to these very tensions, one of the most significant challenges to
the traditional meaning of autonomy within bioethics has come from feminist
ethics, a scholarly tradition that straddles sociology and ethics, and its
proposed alternative concept – relational autonomy. Advocates of relational
autonomy point to a need to rethink the concept as a characteristic of persons
who are ‘emotional, embodied, desiring, creating and feeling as well as
rational’ (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Although a helpful reconceptualisa-
tion for troubling notions of what it means to be autonomous, this work is less
concerned with the development and application of abstract ethical concepts,
but is instead interested in the ways in which moral understandings are
produced over time, in the course of clinical encounters.
Personhood as the production of social practices
This study therefore seeks to embed itself in social practices, to show the ways
in which personhood is maintained through social relations. Cicourel’s (2013)
study, for example, shows the ways in which caregivers of people with
dementia perform socio-cultural ‘scaffolding’, helping their loved ones to
maintain competency in social life and to stabilise their social identity. Such
scaffolding practices include supplying leading questions that help give an
appearance of a speech event. An example of this practice is shown below in a
husband and wife’s response to a clinician’s question about coping with
memory lapses. The patient originally looks perturbed by the question and
there is a momentary pause before the wife takes the initiative to enable him
to respond:
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Wife: You do write things down and refer to things, like your diary, don’t
you dear?
Patient: Yes that’s right.
Such practices are relied upon by patients to sustain ‘appropriate’ or
‘expected’ social interaction, thus simulating a sense of ‘normal cultural
stability’ (Cicourel, 2013). These interactions are evidence of the ways in
which autonomy – if understood to be a central component of our sense of self –
must be produced and maintained in social practices. This not only points to
the necessity to rethink the meaning of autonomy (as scholars have in the
promotion of relational autonomy), drawing more on ideas of relatedness, but
also highlights the ways in which ethics are themselves produced, maintained
and challenged in everyday interactions betweeen social actors. Contrary to
an ethics that assumes the dominance of knowledge, derived by theory over
practice, ethnographically informed qualitative sociology shows instead how
practice is the method through which knowledge, normative order, rationality
and meaning are accomplished (Lynch, 2001).
Dementia diagnosis and everyday moral reasoning
There is a strong tradition of ethnographic work that explores the everyday
accomplishments of moral decision-making in the clinic. Hoffmaster’s (1992)
case for the benefits of ethnography to the field of medical ethics, for example,
expertly presents the small, pragmatic strategies employed by practitioners to
navigate moral concerns. More specific to the field of dementia, Beard (2008)
describes how moral reasoning, such as decisions regarding how and when to
deliver a diagnosis, or if and how to use the Alzheimer’s Disease label, are
framed by organisational cultures within memory clinics including the object
of trust (invested in either individual clinicians or a collective sense of medical
expertise) and the framing of conditions such as Mild Cognitive Impairment
(MCI) (as either a chronic condition to be managed or a scientific puzzle to
solve). Similarly, in the current study, the disciplinary cultures of the memory
clinic staff are shown to shape their approach to assessments, diagnosis and
hence the ethical framing of the clinical encounter. The following extract is
taken from an interview with a neurologist who describes the difference
between how she approaches the diagnostic process, built, as she explains,
through her disciplinary training:
R: I suspect that there are large swathes of people who are and again there
are all these psychiatrists who dispense the pills and say you’ve got brain
rot, you’ve got brain rot and everything looks like Alzheimer’s.
I: Do you think there’s still quite a lot of misdiagnosis?
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R: Yeah definitely, definitely. So we used to see lots of, well I think I saw
quite a few interesting people come through that clinic and I’m not
putting myself up but I think that when you approach it in the light of
what is wrong with this person? Rather than is this Alzheimer’s or not?
You’re focus shifts…To a certain extent it depends, I suppose my way of
practising is very, it’s quite artisan and small scale, finickity. I see a few
people and do everything I can for them rather than Henry Ford
production line model of everyone’s the same ultimately.
This extract illustrates how disciplinary cultures, as well as organisational
cultures, play a significant role in the framing of the consultation and mediates
clinicians’ conceptions of and approach to their ethical practice in relation to
diagnosis; in this case, the ethical impetus is on the integrity of the diagnosis
itself, and the methods through which to achieve it, rather than if, when or
how it is delivered. This is illustrative of the implicit (and explicit) moral
calculus that informs clinical practitioner’s everyday actions and decision-
making (Featherstone et al, 2006). Furthermore, this calculus is made up of
many competing systems of categorisation that represent clinical, organisa-
tional and societal concerns (Bosk, 1979; McHugh, 1970).
This study shows how, in the course of clinicians’ interactions with patients
and families in memory clinics, practitioners’ employ similar kinds of
pragmatic strategies to those described by Hoffmaster (1992) to navigate
ethical concerns regarding the sharing of clinical information. Time is a
particularly useful resource for clinicians in the memory clinic. The uncer-
tainty of a dementia diagnosis, the insidiousness of its developing symptoms
and the lack of a time-critical cure can create the potential for practitioners to
bide their time, to use time as a resource through which to provide a potential
practical solution to the ongoing concern regarding the communicating of a
diagnosis. The biding of time was therefore often recounted as a means of
responding to moral dilemmas, as illustrated in this extract, taken from an
interview with a general practitioner half way through a year’s placement in
the memory team:
With this particular condition it’s not as if I have a cure to be able to give
you now and so I’m stopping things happening from here so we actually
have got time on our hands to be able to wait 8 months to give that
diagnosis, ‘cause actually there’s nothing much you can change.
This account highlights the resources that time can offer in navigating ethical
decisions regarding if, how and when to provide patients and families with
information. Of course the ability to bide your time in the context of the
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memory clinic was described by some as being under increasing threat, as one
of the specialist nurses working in the memory clinic described:
The label is put on because you feel under pressure not to give another
appointment.
The increasing numbers of people accessing memory clinic services and the
growing public awareness with regards to dementia medicines were both
described by clinic staff as placing more pressures on them to diagnose
promptly, to free up appointments for new patients as well as to give people
access to medication. Such pressure potentially undermines the utility of time,
as a pragmatic tool through which to navigate ethical issues regarding if,
when and how to communicate a diagnosis.
Clinical tests and examinations also offer practitioners tools through which
to foreground particular kinds of clinical information, at particular moments.
In the memory clinic, the presentation of the CT scan is a good example of
how results of clinical tests can be made present or absent at particular
moments to aid clinicians in the everyday navigation of ethical concerns.
Decisions regarding if, when and how a CT scan is brought into the
consultation process provide clinicians with tools to reassure patients and
families; provide greater certainty to a difficult diagnosis; or, conversely, to re-
emphasise uncertainty and the importance of time and clinical judgement:
As the conversation continues with the couple (see the extract on page 9
which describes an earlier moment in the consultation), the doctor gives
the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, pointing to the changes on the CT
scan which is left displayed on the wall above the table where the doctor
and the couple sit,
Wife: Are you saying that it could develop into Alzheimer’s?
Doctor: I think it probably has Mrs Jones, is what I’m saying. I think there’s
a line you know.
Patient: It’s started.
Wife: Is there anything that he can take to slow it down?
Doctor: Well I think this is why we need to discuss this at this point really.
So there are medications for Alzheimer’s. So I think what’s
happened here we’ve had progressive memory problems. There
comes a point, particularly when you begin to see the changes on
the CT scan, that we’ve got enough information to say that this is
probably Alzheimer’s Disease.
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In this example, the CT scan was brought into the consultation to help secure
a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, to signify and visually represent a change
from what was previously described as ongoing memory problems to now
being described as a degenerative brain disease. Drugs and medication were
also described by some memory clinic staff as a resource through which they
were able to soften the communication of a diagnosis, shifting the focus away
from a diagnostic label and instead to discuss treatment and intervention
plans, as described by one of the clinic nurses:
You know, we say that we’re a bit… also not to make a big deal of it, but
just to mention, you know, that it could be this and, you know… and we
use tablets, I’ve got to say, as a thing to be positive. You know, that we
think that it could be an early Alzheimer’s type condition, but we’ve got
these tablets that can help.
Finally, the consultation process itself – and the developing interactions that
occur between patient, family and clinician – allow practitioners to probe
families, gaining insight into their expectations, preparedness or anxieties
regarding the potential information or diagnosis that might be shared, as this
extract from a memory clinic clinician describes:
You can gauge from the beginning whether they think they’ve come here
for a dementia diagnosis or whether they think oh there’s something
going on, I’m not quite sure. And you try and work out how much
information they want and how much information they already have and
how much they’re already looked up. And, you know, have they kind of
looked up and they know it’s the diagnosis and they just want you to
confirm it, or whether they actually have no idea whatsoever and they’re
not quite sure why mum’s a little bit disorientated…if I’m very
convinced and it’s very obvious that there is something more significant,
then, you know, we say float the idea. So usually again I float it with the
carer first depending on how the patient is.
Understanding and assessing a person’s memory problems, reaching a
diagnosis, communicating a diagnosis and prognosis and making decisions
regarding future treatment and interventions are made in processes of
negotiation and collaboration between patients, families and physicians
(Hansen et al, 2008). Focussing on a distinct moment of diagnosis disclosure
therefore fails to recognise the negotiated nature of ethical decision-making
that occurs over time and in collaboration (Fox and Swazey, 2008; Zussman,
1997), and the ethical interest in broader contextual issues beyond the
‘moment’ of disclosure.
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Sociology of medicine, in particular, illustrates how diagnoses are social
practices and, as such, involve a process of interaction between actors – a
process that begins with a patient’s story which juxtaposes and merges with
the doctor’s story in order for a diagnosis to materialise (Goldstein Yutel,
2011). During this process, significant decisions are made that inform the
moral and ethical content of clinic interactions. For example, in the case of
dementia diagnosis, decisions regarding what assessment tools to use, and at
what stage of the assessment process to use them, are as much dependent
upon ethical concerns as they are clinical judgements. These may include
concerns regarding the patient and family’s capacity to understand the tool
and its purpose, or the need to balance the clinical effectiveness of an
assessment tool with the potential harm it may cause. Furthermore, patients
and families are more than passive recipients of information; their interactions
with physicians inform clinical evaluations and shape the ethical content of
clinical interactions in multiple ways (Balint, 1964; Leder, 1990). A patient’s
denial of symptoms, a patient and/or family’s desire for information, strained
relationships between family members and the mood of the patient all inform
doctor–patient interactions and shape the physician’s decision-making in the
building and the communicating of a diagnosis. Any distinction made
between the ethical interest held within the act of communicating a diagnosis
and the building of that diagnosis is thus an arbitrary one, as the following
extract from a member of staff from a memory clinic describes:
It can be a discussion, ‘‘I don’t know what we’re going to find in this
process but it may be this or there are these other causes.’’ You can ask,
at this stage, ‘‘Are you the kind of person that likes to know or someone
who would prefer not to know?’’ It makes it less start I think ‘cause you
haven’t gone from nothing and then suddenly you’re saying the
diagnosis. It can start to be floated or considered or thought about and
unfold so by the time you’re bringing information together and this
might be looking more like a dementia, say ‘‘Well look, I am starting to
think we might be looking at this. We need to see how things go a bit.’’ It
can evolve a bit more.
What counts as ethical? Risk and mild cognitive impairment
(MCI)
This restricted view of what counts as an ethical concern has historically been
an interest of the social sciences (Haimes, 2002). In the quest to think
differently about ethics and ethical engagement, sociology and the social
sciences has attempted to question the taken-for-granted nature with which
some aspects of bioethics are conceived. Empirical research and social science
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is able to raise ethical issues that would otherwise remain hidden. In the case
of dementia diagnosis, the ethical impetus has been to achieve greater access
to assessment and diagnosis for those with memory problems (Russell et al,
2013). Sociological empirical research is able to show the moral dilemmas
produced as a result of an initial moral concern (see Price, 1997). In this case,
the initial moral concern was one of equality and justice to ensure greater
equity in the accessing of a dementia diagnosis. The consequence of this
initial moral concern has been the increasing number of patients accessing
assessment for problems with memory and cognition at an earlier stage. This
has meant that there are increasing numbers of people being categorised as
having a ‘pre-condition’ such as MCI, a condition that carries a significant
degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty exacerbates the ethical issues to
navigate between practitioners, patients and families.
The rights of patients to be fully informed, bound up in the principle of
respect for autonomy, is particularly complex in situations where the
information on offer carries so much uncertainty (Bharadwaj, 2002). Due to
the poor predictive capacity of MCI for determining whether a person will
progress on to develop dementia, it is difficult to determine what a diagnosis
of MCI means. Is it part of getting older? Is it a diagnosis of a condition, or
early dementia or is it a risk status indicating that you might get dementia in
the future? (Bender, 2003). Such uncertainty is reflected in the accounts
offered by clinicians who describe the difficulties they experience in making
decisions regarding the sharing of information regarding risk:
I’m uneasy about that. With MCIs, there are no effective interven-
tions…and then you’re leaving people with a diagnosis that they might
get a horrible degenerative brain disease which we also can’t do
anything about.
In this account, it is the practical and pragmatic concerns regarding risk,
meaningful risk and its relationship with clinical intervention that creates the
clinician’s feeling of unease regarding the communication of a pre-condition
like MCI. This account reflects the grounded and pragmatic nature of ethical
decision-making that occurs in the clinic. Such decision-making does not
reside in a weighing up of conflicting ethical norms constituted as opposing
binaries (Hoffmaster, 1992), but are instead based on the perceived meaning
and usefulness of the information available to patients. The fuzziness of the
boundaries separating MCI from dementia, and the implications that the
different labels can have, means that concerns regarding the interests and
circumstances of patients and families can become integral to the process of
assigning such labels, as the following extract describes:
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I’ve got a gentleman I’m going round to this afternoon now, he came to
clinic, I think he was seen twice with mild cognitive impairment. Then
he was re-referred and we saw him a couple of months ago, and again
there was no change on his… well a very subtle change on the
Addenbrooke’s. You know, he just dropped a couple of points but was
still scoring really well. But just in my interaction with him, he was a bit
sort of fluffy round the edges and you know when you get that feeling
that this isn’t right for a very articulate, intelligent gentleman, and the
wife was reporting, you know, that things were deteriorating a bit. But
again, I think the doctor was a bit lacking in confidence to put a label on
it and we’re still calling it mild cognitive impairment, but the wife is
really unhappy with that and she rang them a couple of weeks ago with
more evidence of how his functioning is going down. And so we have
sort of said, well yes it could be early Alzheimer’s, so I’m taking the
medication out ‘cause she was really keen to get him on the tablets.
Such a pragmatic approach also accounts for situational differences that occur
in the decision-making practices of clinicians, where information may be
perceived to have more or less benefit depending on a patient’s stage of life,
their family circumstances or their perceived preparedness:
I did tell her she had MCI and didn’t know which way this would go, but,
I felt, why distress her when there is no certainty, although I had a strong
feeling (that it would progress). So it does depend on the preparedness, I
am aware that I do make those judgements. I don’t give people
information in the same way.
As the two previous examples illustrate, the communication of risk and the
subsequent shaping of ethical practice has to be negotiated in processes of
interaction between patients, doctors and families. In a similar vein to the
diagnosis of a dementia, albeit with the uncertainty heightened, the
navigation of moral dilemmas occurs through similar kinds of small,
pragmatic strategies, so that the meaning attributed to a patient’s risk status
is produced in collaborative processes, taking account of context and
situational circumstances.
Discussion
This paper challenges the assumption that there are distinct moments in
which practitioners make ethical decisions, responding to and evaluating
moral norms. The examples from the memory clinic interactions and the
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accounts of memory clinic staff highlight some key aspects of the diagnostic
process and how these practices and interactions help in navigating moral
concerns collaboratively, producing an ethics of diagnosis through the course
of the clinical encounter. This article illustrates this through three key
contributions. Firstly, the work pays attention to the socio-cultural and
historical framing of moral norms, particularly in relation to autonomy and
personhood, and shows how these are challenged by patient’s own accounts
of the ways in which memory is experienced and by the meanings attached to
memory and dementia. By doing this, the article highlights the tensions
between the meanings of personhood produced through particular aspects of
principalist ethics and the socially mediated nature of memory problems and
their interpretation by individuals and families, illustrative of a personhood
that is situated, embodied and relational. Such tensions and contradictions are
shown to be present in the accounts of memory clinic staff, particularly when
describing the ethics of their practice.
Secondly, the paper builds on existing literature to show the significance of
the broader cultural and organisational contexts in which ethical concerns are
negotiated, taking account of both disciplinary and organisational cultures
that shape dementia diagnosis. This is important in shaping the ways in which
diagnosis are reached which, when recognising the processual nature of
ethical practice, has an important part to play in framing the communication
of clinical information and the meanings attached to it. This attention to
context and practices also highlights the small, pragmatic strategies through
which practitioners respond to ethical problems and the processes through
which clinicians, patients and families collaborate in the diagnostic process –
shaping and moulding the ethicality of clinical consultations.
Finally, ethnography, as a method, is shown to provide distinct insights into
the production of ethics in the clinic. Ethnography provides a means of getting
inside everyday practices in order to achieve empathy and experience of what
is being observed. Puig de la Bellacasa and Latimer (2013), in their paper on
rethinking the ethical, shift the conception of ethics from the abstractions of
traditional bioethics and instead forefront what they describe as moments of
care whereby actors – in our case clinicians – attach themselves to particular
ideas, accounts and materials. This does not renounce ethical engagement but
rather locates ethics in practices thus adhering to an ethicality in process. The
benefit of an ethnographic approach in this study is therefore in being able to
identify practices that are experienced as showing care. For example, the
pragmatic strategies for navigating moral concerns highlighted in the article
suggest that extending moments of uncertainty and holding on to aspects of
collectively in processes of assessment and diagnosis in the memory clinic
may provide the resources for the production of ethical (or careful) practice
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(see also Kerr et al, 2007 for a similar argument regarding ambiguity in
relation to the use of genetic research). Of course the benefits of an
ethnographic approach, which enable this kind of care to be identified, are
also indicative of its limitations, restricting the researcher’s ability to observe
at a distance.
In summary, by providing an ethnographic account of ethical practice in
the context of dementia diagnosis, this article builds on earlier work
(Hoffmaster, 1992; Haimes, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2004) that makes a case for the
contribution of medical sociology, ethnography and the social sciences more
generally to the study of ethics in medical practice. This study highlights the
practices that produce ethics in the context of dementia diagnosis, the social,
clinical and organisational cultures that shape them and the collaborative
and processual nature with which they are accomplished. Thus, to inform
change and shape behaviour in the context of clinical practice necessitates a
consideration of social relations, structures, processes and cultures. This
ethnography of dementia diagnosis therefore illustrates how social scientists
can contribute to an understanding of ethics, precisely by foregrounding
contexts and practices.
Acknowledgments
This research was funded as part of a Wellcome Trust postdoctoral fellowship
award (WT091772). I would like to thank the clinical directors and staff at the
memory clinics who took part in the research and allowed me to observe their
practice. I am also especially thankful to the patients and families who
allowed me to be present during their consultations and who gave their time
to take part in interviews about their experiences.
About the Author
Alexandra Hillman is a medical sociologist with a particular interest in the care
and treatment of older people. Her research has explored the relationship
between the organisation of health services and the treatment and care of
older people. She has engaged in conceptions of care, morality and ethical
practice and her recent work focusses on the social and ethical aspects of
dementia diagnosis and what it means to live well with dementia.
Hillman
62  2016 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 1, 44–65
References
Arras, J. (1991). Getting down to cases: The revival of casuistry in bioethics. The journal of
medicine and philosophy., 16, 29–57.
Balint, M. (1964). The Doctor, His Patient and the Illness (2nd ed.). Kent: Pitman Medical.
Beard, R. (2008). Trust and memory: Organizational strategies, institutional conditions and trust
negotiations in speciality clinics for Alzheimer’s disease. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 32,
11–30.
Beard, R., & Fox, P. (2008). Resisting social disenfranchisement: Negotiating collective identities
and everyday life with memory loss. Social Science and Medicine, 66, 1509–1520.
Beard, R., & Neary, T. (2013). Making sense of nonsense: experiences of mild cognitive
impairment. Sociology of Health & Illness, 35(1), 130–146.
Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. (2013). The principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed.). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bender, M. (2003). Explorations in dementia. London: Jessica Kingsley publishers.
Bharadwaj, A. (2002). Uncertain risk: Genetic screening for susceptibility to haemochromatosis.
Health, Risk and Society., 4, 227–240.
Bosk, C. (1979). Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
Christman, J. (2004). Relational autonomy, liberal individualism and the social constitution of
selves. Philosophical Studies, 117, 143–164.
Cicourel, A. (2006). The interaction of discourse, cognition and culture. Discourse Studies, 8(1),
25–29.
Cicourel, A. (2011). The effect of neurodegenerative disease on representations of self in
discourse. Neurocase: The Neural Basis of Cognition, 217(3), 251–259.
Cicourel, A. (2013). Origin and demise of socio-cultural presentations of self from birth to death:
Caregiver ‘scaffolding’ practices necessary for guiding and sustaining communal social
structure throughout the life cycle. Sociology, 47(1), 51–73.
Code, L. (1991). Second Persons. What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and Construction of
Knowledge. Cornell University Press: New York.
Corrigan, O. (2003). Empty ethics: The problem with informed consent. Sociology of Health &
Illness, 25(7), 768–792.
DeGrazia, D. (1999). Advance directives, dementia and the ‘someone else problem’. Bioethics, 13,
373–391.
Dekkers, J. (2001). Autonomy and dependence: Chronic physical illness and decision-making
capacity. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 4, 185–192.
Featherstone, K., Atkinson, P., Bharadwaj, A., & Clarke, A. (2006). Risky Relations: Family,
Kinship and the New Genetics. Oxford: Berg.
Fox, R., & Swazey, J. (2008). Observing Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garfinkel, H. (1964). Studies of the routine grounds of everyday activities. Social Problems, 11(3),
225–250.
Goldstein Yutel, A. (2011). Putting A Name To It: Diagnosis In Contemporary Society. Baltimore:
The John Hopkins University Press.
Haimes, E. (2002). What can the social sciences contribute to the study of ethics? Theoretical,
empirical and substantive considerations. Bioethics, 16, 89–113.
Hansen, E., Hughes, C., Routley, G., & Robinson, A. (2008). General practitioners’ experiences
and understandings of diagnosing dementia: Factors impacting on early diagnosis. Social
Science and Medicine, 67(11), 1776–1783.
Hedgecoe, A. (2004). Critical bioethics: Beyond the social critique of applied ethics. Bioethics, 18,
120–143.
Diagnosing dementia
 2016 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 1, 44–65 63
Henrique, C. (2003). Not telling the truth in the patient-physician relationship. Bioethics, 17,
417–424.
Hoffmaster, B. (1992). Can ethnography save the life of medical ethics. Social Science and
Medicine, 35, 1421–1431.
Holm, S. (1995). Not just autonomy – the principles of American biomedical ethics. Journal of
Medical Ethics, 21, 332–338.
Hughes, J. (2001). Views of the person with dementia. Journal of Medical Ethics, 27, 86–91.
Ingold, T. (2014). That’s enough about ethnography! Journal of Ethnogarphic Theory, 4(1),
383–395.
Jenkins, N. (2014). Dementia and the inter-embodied self. Social Theory & Health, 12(2), 125137.
Kerr, A., Cunningham-Burley, S., & Tutton, R. (2007). Exploring ambivalence about genetic
research and its social context. Social Theory & Health, 5(1), 53–69.
Kitwood, T. (1997). The Concept of Personhood and Its Relevance for a New Culture of Dementia
Care. London: Routledge.
Langdon, S., Eagle, A., & Warner, J. (2007). Making sense of dementia in the social world: A
qualitative study. Social Science and Medicine, 64(4), 989–1000.
Leder, D. (1990). Clinical interpretation: The hermeneutics of medicine. Theoretical Medicine,
11(1), 9–24.
Lynch, M. (2001). Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Practice. In T. Schatzki, K. Knorr Cetina, &
E. Von Savigny (Eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (pp. 131–148). Sage: London.
Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (2000). Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy,
Agency and The Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marzanski, M. (2000). Would you like to know what is wrong with you? On telling the truth to
patients with dementia. Journal of Medical Ethics, 26, 108–113.
McHugh, P. (1970). A common sense conception of deviance. In J. Douglas (Ed.), Deviance and
Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings. London: Basic Books.
Moreira, T. (2010). Now or later? Individual disease and care collectives in the memory clinic. In
A. Mol, I. Moser, & J. Pols (Eds.), Care in Practice: On Tinkering in Clinics, Homes and Farms
(pp. 119–140). Transcript: Bielefeld.
Musschenga, A. W. (2005). Empirical ethics, context-sensitivity, and contextualism. Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy, 30, 467–490.
Pinner, G. (2000). Truth telling and the diagnosis of dementia. The British Journal of Psychiatry,
176(6), 514–515.
Powell, R. (2014). Is preventive suicide a rational response to a presymptomatic diagnosis of
dementia? Journal of Medical Ethics, 40(511–512), 35.
Price, F. (1997). No you see it, now you don’t: mediating science and managing uncertainty in
reproductive medicine. In A. Irwin & B. Wynn (Eds.), Misunderstanding Science: The Public Re-
construction of Science and Technology (pp. 84–106). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Puig de la Bellacasa, M., & Latimer, J. (2013). Re-thinking the Ethical: Everyday Shifts of Care in
Biogerontology. In N. Priaulx & A. Wrigley (Eds.), Ethics, Law and Society (pp. 393–410).
Farnham: Ashgate.
Reubi, D. (2013). Re-moralising medicine: The bioethical thought collective and the regulation of
the body in British medical research. Social Theory & Health, 11(2), 215–235.
Russell, P., Banerjee, S., Watt, J., et al. (2013). Improving the identification of people with
dementia in primary care: Evaluation of the impact of primary care dementia coding guidance
on identified prevalence. BMJ Open, 3, e004023. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-004023.
Walker, M. (2010). Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics. London: Routledge.
Zussman, R. (1997). Sociological Perspectives on Medical Ethics and Decision Making. Annual
review of Sociology, 23, 171–189.
Hillman
64  2016 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 1, 44–65
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 3.0 Unported License. The images or other third
party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the
material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users
will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the
material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/3.0/
Diagnosing dementia
 2016 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 1, 44–65 65
